2020年john locke約翰洛克哲學一等獎論文分享（雙語）

題目：Is intuition to philosophy as observation is to science?

翻譯：直覺之於(yu) 哲學就像觀察之於(yu) 科學嗎？

一等獎原文

I. Introduction

Science and philosophy share the fundamental goal of knowledge production. The former explains and predicts the material universe,[1] and the latter seeks to answer questions within the fields of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology.[2] This common objective will contextualise my discussion of observation and intuition as means to the end of producing scientific and philosophical knowledge respectively.

Observation and intuition can both be thought of as independent sources of knowledge. When we observe, we receive information either via direct sensory perception or with the aid of instruments.[3] Intuition, on the other hand, is best defined by what it is not. An intuition does not result from inference, memory, testimony, reason, or observation;[4] of these sources, a knower still believes intuitions to be a priori truths.[5] in the absence

The question of whether intuition is to philosophy as observation is to science can be broken down into three sub-questions:

1. What roles do observation and intuition play in scientific and philosophical knowledge production respectively?

2. How reliably do they fulfil these roles?

3. How exclusively do they occupy these roles?

These sub-questions correspond to the bases of comparison of role, reliability, and exclusivity respectively. The extent to which the set of answers for observation coincides with that of intuition is then the extent to which intuition is to philosophy as observation is to science. With this condition in mind, I propose the following answers.

Firstly, observation and intuition both play evidential roles in supporting and refuting scientific and philosophical claims, and productive roles in producing them. They differ, however, in that evidential observation is used deductively when falsifying scientific knowledge claims, while evidential intuition lacks a deductive function.

Secondly, both observation and intuition possess unreliabilities in precision and accuracy. While certain problems can be accounted for in both cases, observation and intuition still feature seemingly unresolvable issues with accuracy, which therefore threaten reliability.

Lastly, the evidential and productive functions of both observation and intuition are non-exclusive, in that they can, in some cases, be substituted by other sources of knowledge.

Thus, I contend that intuition is largely to philosophy as observation is to science, save for the fact that intuition, unlike observation, is not used deductively.

II. What roles do observation and intuition play in scientific and philosophical knowledge production respectively?

In the production of scientific knowledge, the roles of observation are twofold. When applied to a pre-existing claim, observation is evidential, and can be used to support or falsify said claim. Observation can also precede and bring about the production of knowledge, in which case its function is productive. These roles are not mutually exclusive; observation can produce and later support the same claim.

Observation is used as supporting evidence when corroborating a scientific hypothesis. That is to say, if a specific observation P (“This beaker of water boils at 100°C”) corroborates a general claim Q (“Water boils at 100°C”), we have increased confidence that Q is correct.[6] Moreover, as written by Hume, our confidence in Q tends to grow as more instances of P are observed.[7] In this way, through the corroboration of hypotheses, scientists use particular observations of the natural world to support general explanations of its behaviour.

It is important, however, to differentiate between the deductive and inductive uses of evidential observation. To conclude with epistemic certainty that “all swans are white” from observing any number of white swans is to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent, whereas the mere observation of one non-white swan would suffice to seductively falsify the claim.[8] Therefore, while observation can only serve inductively to support a hypothesis, scientists employ evidential observation deductively when falsifying them.[9]

The productive role of observation is illustrated well by one of science’s most famous anecdotes. One summer, a young Isaac Newton observed an apple fall from a tree. He wondered "why... that apple [should] always descend perpendicularly to the ground", which would later inspire his work on gravity.[10] Science seeks to describe the natural world; the observation of a natural phenomenon can therefore produce scientific knowledge regarding said phenomenon.

Does intuition share the evidential and productive functions of observation? The latter is a significantly less controversial question among philosophers—it seems that, at least sometimes, our intuitions do produce our beliefs. Many philosophers adhered to the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, but adjusted their stances after learning of Gettier-type counterexamples, which produce the intuition that the justified true beliefs they describe do not count as knowledge.[11] If beliefs in the JTB account had caused intuitions regarding knowledge, then Gettier cases would have been dismissed as unintuitive.

The thesis that intuition is used as evidence for and against philosophical beliefs is dubbed Centrality by Cappelen.[12] Opposing Centrality,   Cappelen argues that the description ‘intuitive’, when applied to philosophical claims, can be removed or substituted without loss of meaning.[13] Ichikawa explains in support of this claim that we use intuitive propositions not because they are intuitive, but because they are true.[14] As  Climenhaga notes, these objections are refuted by the fact that our intuitions tend to coincide with our beliefs, and that our confidence in a given belief does not decrease even with the awareness that it has been caused by our intuitions.[15] Centrality provides the best explanation for this phenomenon. Moreover, beyond treating their own intuitions as evidence, philosophers frequently 'explain away' others' intuitions when used to justify opposing claims or as counterexamples to their own; if intuitions were not seen as evidential, this would be unnecessary.[16]

Like observation, intuition thus serves as evidence for and against philosophical claims. Examples of both cases are ubiquitous in philosophical dialogue;[17] other than the aforementioned Gettier problem, which is an instance of the latter, Searle uses the ‘Chinese room’ intuition pump to support his claim that machines cannot understand—they only simulate the ability to do so.[18]

It appears, however, that evidential intuition is not employed deductively. Sound deductive claims rely on true premises, yet Gutting notes that philosophers tend to avoid this requirement with intuitions, neglecting to account for their truth and simply expecting their audience to share the same intuitions.[19] In many occasions, the deductive premise-conclusion structure is not even adhered to, philosophers instead supporting general claims with individual examples and counterexamples of intuitions.[20] Hence, this is where the evidential role of intuition diverges from that of observation: while observation is used deductively to falsify and inductively to support, the role of intuition is limited to that of support.

III. How reliably do they fulfil these roles?

Sources of unreliability can be split into two categories: imprecisions, referring to qualitative or quantitative inexactitudes or variations, and inaccuracies, meaning distance from the truth. The most apparent hindrance to the reliability of observation is the problem of imperfections in our senses and scientific instruments, classified as random and systematicerror. 21] The former results from unpredictable changes in experimental conditions that usually affect precision, while the latter arises from consistent instrumental defects that typically affect accuracy.[22] account for these errors.[23] Nonetheless, scientists are able to analyse and mathematically account for these errors.[23]

A more pressing inaccuracy arises in the theory-ladenness of observation: that our observations are always interpreted through the subjective 'lenses' of the beliefs, or theories, to which we subscribe,[24] limiting our ability to accurately observe a subject in its entirety. Kuhn outlines three types of observational theory-ladenness:

Firstly, our beliefs can directly affect what we perceive. In an experiment by perceptual psychologists Bruner and Postman, subjects repeatedly mistook wrongly-coloured playing cards for their normal counterparts when viewed quickly.[25] This, according to Kuhn, depicts how our perceptions are affected by pur conceptual resources.[26]

Secondly, our beliefs also influence our semantic understanding of the descriptions of observations.[27] For example, a Newtonian physicist would interpret the word 'mass' to refer to a constant, while an Einsteinian would believe the value described by the same term to depend on the velocity of the object in question.[28] This prevents observers subscribing to different theories from truly understanding descriptions of each other's observations.

Lastly, separate aspects of the same observation may vary in salience based on the theories of the observer. Kuhn proposes the thought experiment of Galileo and an Aristotelian physicist observing a pendulum. The Aristotelian, viewing the pendulum’s bob as falling under a string’s constraint, would have given attention to the bob’s weight, vertical displacement, and time taken to come to rest.[29] In contrast, Galileo would treat pendular motion as restricted circular motion, measuring the string's length, angular displacement, and time per swing.[30]

Our intuitions, like observation, also appear to feature ‘imprecision’, or varying intuitions in response to the same stimulus. Experimental philosophers Petrinovich and O’Neill, when surveying participants, found that moral intuitions varied based on how a dilemma was phrased and the order in which different dilemmas were presented.[31] However, Zamzow and Nichols observe that people are less confident in their responsive intuitions to thought experiments when influenced, even unknowingly, by philosophically irrelevant factors.[32] Confidence, therefore, may be a mechanism to qualitatively determine the imprecision of our intuitions, reminiscent of the calculable experimental uncertainty of observations.

In terms of accuracy, Kahneman suggests that like our observations, our intuitions are also influenced by our beliefs and theories that are 'trained' by our environment.[33] A professional chess player can be said to act on highly accurate intuitions during a game due to the regular environment of chess and repeated practice within it.[34] Contrarily, it is difficult to call philosophy a regular environment: philosophical intuitions span a huge range of topics, and may sometimes extend into non-philosophical domains that provide contextual knowledge.[35] Neither can philosophers reliably practice intuiting, as the accuracy of corrective feedback is hard to determine due to the general lack of consensus in the philosophical community (as opposed to chess, which has easily analysable games and binary win-lose outcomes).[36] Like observation, intuition thus also features an accuracy problem, in that it is difficult to define standards by which the truth of intuitions can be determined in the first place.

IV. How exclusively do they occupy these roles?

Although observation is a heavily utilised evidential source for most of the empirical sciences,[37] exceptions exist in abstract disciplines like theoretical physics. Ellis and Silk criticise string theorists and proponents of the many-worlds interpretation for relying on the "elegance"  and explanatory power of their theories, rather than empirical observation, as supporting evidence for their veracity.[38] Since their theories describe unobservable phenomena, an observation also loses the ability to falsify their claims.[39] Regardless of the normative question of whether observation ought to be used as scientific evidence, that the scientific community has, in fact, appealed to alternative sources of evidence shows the non-exclusivity of observation’s evidential role.

Describing non-observational causes of scientific knowledge production may be more difficult as many scientific claims fundamentally result from observation; even theoretical claims like string theory seek to explain observed phenomena.[40] Accounts exist, however, of other unconscious processes producing knowledge claims, such as August Kekulé's dream of an ouroboros inspiring him to describe the ring-shaped structure of benzene,[41] which was only confirmed directly by observation in the following century.[42]

The emergent field of experimental philosophy illustrates well the non-exclusivity of intuition’s evidential role in philosophy. Beyond intuition, contemporary evidential sources have expanded to encompass reaction times,[43] neuroimaging,[44] and human behaviour,[45] using observation, in fact, to support philosophical claims.

Experimental philosophy also features alternative sources of philosophical knowledge production. Schwitzgebel and Rust questioned if ethics professors behaved with higher or more consistent moral standards than their non-ethicist colleagues; only after collecting behavioural data could they formulate the claim that there is generally no variation between ethicists' and non-ethicists' moral behaviour.[46] As a whole, therefore, observation and intuition do not exclusively fulfil their evidential and productive functions.

V. Conclusion

Of the three bases of comparison—role, reliability, and exclusivity—intuition and observation are similar on all counts, with the exception that intuition, unlike observation, does not play a deductive role in philosophy. Thus, I conclude that less the aforementioned difference, intuition is to philosophy as observation is to science.

中文翻譯

一、簡介

科學和哲學共享知識生產(chan) 的基本目標。前者解釋和預測物質宇宙，[1]後者試圖回答邏輯、認識論、形而上學和價(jia) 值論領域內(nei) 的問題。[2]這個(ge) 共同的目標將把我對觀察和直覺的討論聯係起來，分別作為(wei) 產(chan) 生科學和哲學知識的手段。

觀察和直覺都可以被認為(wei) 是獨立的知識來源。當我們(men) 觀察時，我們(men) 通過直接的感官知覺或借助儀(yi) 器來接收信息。[3]另一方麵，直覺最好由它不是什麽(me) 來定義(yi) 。直覺並非來自推理、記憶、見證、推理或觀察；[4]在這些來源中，知識者仍然相信直覺是先驗真理。[5]在缺席的情況下

直覺之於(yu) 哲學就像觀察之於(yu) 科學一樣，這個(ge) 問題可以分解為(wei) 三個(ge) 子問題：

1. 觀察和直覺在科學和哲學知識生產(chan) 中分別扮演什麽(me) 角色？

2. 他們(men) 履行這些角色的可靠性如何？

3. 他們(men) 對這些角色的排他性如何？

這些子問題分別對應於(yu) 角色、可靠性和排他性比較的基礎。觀察的答案集合與(yu) 直覺的一致的程度就是直覺對哲學的程度，就像觀察對科學的程度一樣。考慮到這種情況，我提出以下答案。

首先，觀察和直覺在支持和反駁科學和哲學主張方麵都發揮著證據作用，在產(chan) 生這些主張方麵發揮著生產(chan) 性作用。然而，它們(men) 的不同之處在於(yu) ，在偽(wei) 造科學知識主張時，證據觀察被演繹地使用，而證據直覺則缺乏演繹功能。

其次，觀察和直覺在精度和準確性上都存在不可靠性。雖然在這兩(liang) 種情況下都可以解決(jue) 某些問題，但觀察和直覺仍然具有看似無法解決(jue) 的準確性問題，因此會(hui) 威脅到可靠性。

最後，觀察和直覺的證據和生產(chan) 功能都是非排他性的，因為(wei) 在某些情況下，它們(men) 可以被其他知識來源所取代。

因此，我認為(wei) 直覺之於(yu) 哲學，就像觀察之於(yu) 科學一樣，除了直覺與(yu) 觀察不同，它不用於(yu) 演繹。

二、觀察和直覺在科學和哲學知識生產中分別扮演什麽角色？

在科學知識的生產(chan) 中，觀察的作用是雙重的。當應用於(yu) 先前存在的主張時，觀察是證據性的，可用於(yu) 支持或偽(wei) 造所述主張。觀察也可以先於(yu) 並帶來知識的生產(chan) ，在這種情況下，它的功能是生產(chan) 性的。這些角色並不相互排斥；觀察可以產(chan) 生並隨後支持相同的主張。

在證實科學假設時，觀察被用作支持證據。也就是說，如果一個(ge) 特定的觀察 P（“這個(ge) 燒杯中的水在 100°C 沸騰”）證實了一個(ge) 普遍的主張 Q（“水在 100°C 沸騰”），我們(men) 就增加了 Q 是正確的信心。[6]此外，正如 Hume 所寫(xie) ，我們(men) 對 Q 的信心往往會(hui) 隨著觀察到 P 的更多實例而增長。[7]通過這種方式，通過對假設的證實，科學家們(men) 使用對自然世界的特定觀察來支持對其行為(wei) 的一般解釋。

然而，重要的是區分證據觀察的演繹和歸納用途。從(cong) 觀察任意數量的白天鵝中得出“所有天鵝都是白色的”的認知確定性結論是犯了肯定結果的謬誤，而僅(jin) 僅(jin) 觀察一隻非白天鵝就足以誘人地證偽(wei) 這一主張。[8]因此，雖然觀察隻能以歸納方式支持假設，但科學家在證偽(wei) 時采用演繹觀察。[9]

科學界最著名的軼事之一很好地說明了觀察的生產(chan) 性作用。一個(ge) 夏天，年輕的艾薩克·牛頓（Isaac Newton）觀察到一個(ge) 蘋果從(cong) 樹上掉下來。他想知道“為(wei) 什麽(me) ……那個(ge) 蘋果（應該）總是垂直於(yu) 地麵下降”，這後來激發了他對重力的研究。[10]科學試圖描述自然世界；因此，對自然現象的觀察可以產(chan) 生關(guan) 於(yu) 該現象的科學知識。

直覺是否具有觀察的證據和生產(chan) 功能？後者在哲學家中是一個(ge) 爭(zheng) 議明顯較少的問題——似乎，至少有時，我們(men) 的直覺確實產(chan) 生了我們(men) 的信念。許多哲學家堅持對知識的正當化真信念（JTB）說明，但在學習(xi) 了蓋蒂爾式的反例後調整了立場，從(cong) 而產(chan) 生了他們(men) 所描述的正當化真信念不被視為(wei) 知識的直覺。[11]如果對 JTB 帳戶的信念引起了關(guan) 於(yu) 知識的直覺，那麽(me) Gettier 案例就會(hui) 被認為(wei) 不直觀而被駁回。

直覺被用作支持和反對哲學信仰的證據的論點被卡佩倫(lun) 稱為(wei) 中心性。[12] 反對中心性，卡佩倫(lun) 認為(wei) ，當應用於(yu) 哲學主張時，“直覺”的描述可以被刪除或替換而不會(hui) 失去意義(yi) 。[13] Ichikawa 解釋說，我們(men) 使用直覺命題不是因為(wei) 它們(men) 是直覺的，而是因為(wei) 它們(men) 是真實的。[14] 正如 Climenhaga 所指出的，這些反對意見被以下事實所駁斥：我們(men) 的直覺往往與(yu) 我們(men) 的信念一致，並且即使我們(men) 意識到它是由我們(men) 的直覺引起的，我們(men) 對給定信念的信心也不會(hui) 降低。[15]中心性為(wei) 這種現象提供了最好的解釋。此外，除了將自己的直覺視為(wei) 證據之外，哲學家們(men) 還經常“解釋”他人的直覺，以證明對立的主張或作為(wei) 自己的反例。如果直覺不被視為(wei) 證據，這將是不必要的。[16]

與(yu) 觀察一樣，直覺因此可以作為(wei) 支持和反對哲學主張的證據。這兩(liang) 種情況的例子在哲學對話中無處不在。[17]除了前麵提到的 Gettier 問題（後者的一個(ge) 例子）之外，Searle 使用“中國房間”直覺泵來支持他的說法，即機器無法理解——它們(men) 隻是模擬了這樣做的能力。[18]

然而，證據直覺似乎並沒有被演繹地運用。合理的演繹主張依賴於(yu) 真實的前提，但古廷指出，哲學家傾(qing) 向於(yu) 用直覺來避免這一要求，忽視解釋他們(men) 的真理，隻是期望他們(men) 的聽眾(zhong) 分享同樣的直覺。[19]在許多情況下，甚至沒有堅持演繹前提-結論結構，哲學家反而用直覺的個(ge) 別例子和反例來支持一般主張。[20]因此，這就是直覺的證據作用與(yu) 觀察的不同之處：觀察被用於(yu) 演繹證偽(wei) 和歸納支持，直覺的作用僅(jin) 限於(yu) 支持。

三、他們履行這些角色的可靠性如何？

不可靠性的來源可以分為(wei) 兩(liang) 類：不精確，指的是定性或定量的不精確或變化，以及不準確，指的是與(yu) 事實的距離。觀察可靠性的最明顯障礙是我們(men) 的感官和科學儀(yi) 器的缺陷問題，被歸類為(wei) 隨機和係統誤差。 21] 前者是由通常會(hui) 影響精度的實驗條件的不可預測變化引起的，而後者是由通常會(hui) 影響精度的一致的儀(yi) 器缺陷引起的。[22]解釋了這些錯誤。[23]盡管如此，科學家們(men) 還是能夠分析並在數學上解釋這些錯誤。[23]

觀察的理論負載出現了一個(ge) 更緊迫的不準確性：我們(men) 的觀察總是通過我們(men) 所認同的信念或理論的主觀“鏡頭”來解釋，[24]限製了我們(men) 準確觀察一個(ge) 主題的能力。整體(ti) 。庫恩概述了三種類型的觀測理論負擔：

首先，我們(men) 的信念可以直接影響我們(men) 的感知。在感知心理學家布魯納和波斯特曼的一項實驗中，受試者在快速查看時反複將錯誤顏色的撲克牌誤認為(wei) 是正常對手。[25]根據庫恩的說法，這描述了我們(men) 的感知如何受到純粹概念資源的影響。[26]

其次，我們(men) 的信念也會(hui) 影響我們(men) 對觀察描述的語義(yi) 理解。[27]例如，牛頓物理學家將“質量”一詞解釋為(wei) 常數，而愛因斯坦主義(yi) 者則認為(wei) 同一術語所描述的值取決(jue) 於(yu) 所討論物體(ti) 的速度。[28]這阻止了讚同不同理論的觀察者真正理解對彼此觀察的描述。

最後，同一觀察的不同方麵可能會(hui) 根據觀察者的理論在顯著性上有所不同。庫恩提出了伽利略和亞(ya) 裏士多德物理學家觀察鍾擺的思想實驗。亞(ya) 裏士多德主義(yi) 者將鍾擺的擺錘視為(wei) 落入繩索的約束，他會(hui) 注意擺錘的重量、垂直位移和靜止所需的時間。[29]相比之下，伽利略將擺動運動視為(wei) 受限圓周運動，測量弦的長度、角位移和每次擺動的時間。[30]

我們(men) 的直覺，就像觀察一樣，似乎也具有“不精確”的特征，或者是對相同刺激的反應不同的直覺。實驗哲學家 Petrinovich 和 O'Neill 在調查參與(yu) 者時發現，道德直覺會(hui) 因困境的表達方式以及不同困境出現的順序而異。[31]然而，Zamzow 和 Nichols 觀察到，當受到哲學上無關(guan) 因素的影響，甚至是在不知不覺中，人們(men) 對他們(men) 對思想實驗的反應直覺的信心不足。[32]因此，信心可能是一種機製，可以定性地確定我們(men) 直覺的不精確性，讓人想起可計算的觀察實驗不確定性。

在準確性方麵，卡尼曼建議，就像我們(men) 的觀察一樣，我們(men) 的直覺也受到我們(men) 的信念和理論的影響，這些信念和理論是由我們(men) 的環境“訓練”的。[33]由於(yu) 國際象棋的規則環境和反複練習(xi) ，可以說職業(ye) 棋手在比賽中根據高度準確的直覺行事。[34]相反，很難將哲學稱為(wei) 常規環境：哲學直覺跨越了廣泛的主題，有時可能延伸到提供上下文知識的非哲學領域。[35]哲學家也不能可靠地練習(xi) 直覺，因為(wei) 由於(yu) 哲學界普遍缺乏共識，糾正反饋的準確性很難確定（與(yu) 國際象棋相反，國際象棋具有易於(yu) 分析的遊戲和二元輸贏結果）。[36]與(yu) 觀察一樣，直覺也因此也存在準確性問題，因為(wei) 很難定義(yi) 可以首先確定直覺真實性的標準。

四、他們對這些角色的排他性如何？

盡管對於(yu) 大多數經驗科學來說，觀察是一種被大量使用的證據來源，但[37]例外情況存在於(yu) 理論物理學等抽象學科中。埃利斯和西爾克批評弦理論家和多世界解釋的支持者依賴於(yu) 他們(men) 理論的“優(you) 雅”和解釋力，而不是經驗觀察，作為(wei) 其真實性的支持證據。 [38]由於(yu) 他們(men) 的理論描述了不可觀察的現象，觀察也失去了偽(wei) 造其主張的能力。[39]不管觀察是否應該被用作科學證據的規範性問題，事實上，科學界已經訴諸其他證據來源，這表明觀察的證據作用的非排他性。

描述科學知識生產(chan) 的非觀察原因可能更加困難，因為(wei) 許多科學主張從(cong) 根本上源於(yu) 觀察；甚至像弦理論這樣的理論主張也試圖解釋觀察到的現象。[40]然而，存在其他產(chan) 生知識主張的無意識過程，例如奧古斯特·凱庫勒（August Kekulé）對銜尾蛇的夢想，啟發他描述苯的環狀結構，[41]直到下個(ge) 世紀才通過觀察直接證實. [42]

實驗哲學的新興(xing) 領域很好地說明了直覺在哲學中的證據作用的非排他性。除了直覺，當代的證據來源已經擴展到包括反應時間、[43] 神經影像學、[44]和人類行為(wei) ，[45]實際上使用觀察來支持哲學主張。

實驗哲學還具有哲學知識生產(chan) 的替代來源。Schwitzgebel 和 Rust 質疑倫(lun) 理學教授的行為(wei) 是否比他們(men) 的非倫(lun) 理學同事更高或更一致的道德標準；隻有在收集了行為(wei) 數據之後，他們(men) 才能提出倫(lun) 理學家和非倫(lun) 理學家的道德行為(wei) 之間通常沒有差異的主張。[46] 因此，作為(wei) 一個(ge) 整體(ti) ，觀察和直覺並不完全履行它們(men) 的證據和生產(chan) 功能。

五、結論

在比較的三個(ge) 基礎——作用、可靠性和排他性——中，直覺和觀察在所有方麵都是相似的，除了直覺與(yu) 觀察不同，它在哲學中不扮演演繹角色。因此，我得出結論，減去上述差異，直覺之於(yu) 哲學就像觀察之於(yu) 科學一樣。

Footnotes

1 Richard Purtill, “The Purpose of Science,” Philosophy of Science 37, no. 2 (1970): 301-06, www.jstor.org/stable/186678.

2 Archie J. Bahm, “What is Philosophy?” The Scientific Monthly 52, no. 6 (1941): 553-60, www.jstor.org/stable/17261.

3 Roberto Torretti, “Observation,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, no. 1 (1986): 1-23, www.jstor.org/stable/686995.

4 Nevin Climenhaga, “Intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy,” Mind 127, no. 505 (2018): 69-104, https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/127/505/69/3800471.

5 Ernest Sosa, "Postscript to 'Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology,'" in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 151.

6 Peter Ellerton, “What exactly is the scientific method and why do so many people get it wrong?” School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry - University of Queensland, last modified November 30, 2016, accessed June 17, 2020,

https://hpi.uq.edu.au/article/2016/09/what-exactly-scientific-method-and-why-do-so-many-people-get-i t-wrong.

7 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg, 2006), 36, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm.

8 A. C. Grayling, The history of philosophy (New York: Penguin, 2019), 397.

9 Ellerton, “Scientific method.”

10 Steve Connor, “The core of truth behind Sir Isaac Newton’s apple,” The Independent, January 18, 2010, accessed June 18, 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/the-core-of-truth-behind-sir-isaac-newtons-apple-1870915.html.

11 Stephen Hetherington, "Gettier Problems," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed July 05, 2020, https://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier/

12 Herman Cappelen, Philosophy without Intuitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.

13 Ibid.

14 Jonathan Ichikawa, "Who needs intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques," in Intuitions, ed. Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 236. 15 Climenhaga, “Intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy.”

16 Ibid.

17 Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.), 2.

18 John Searle, “Minds, Brains and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 417-57, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756.

19 Gary Gutting, "Can Philosophical Beliefs Be Rationally Justified?" American Philosophical Quarterly

19, no. 4 (1982): 315-30, www.jstor.org/stable/20013972.

20 Ibid.

21 John Robert Taylor, An Introduction to Error Analysis: The Study of Uncertainties in Physical Measurements (Sausalito, California: University Science Books, 1999), 94.

22 “Random vs Systematic Error,” UMD Department of Physics - UMD Physics, accessed July 06, 2020, https://www.physics.umd.edu/courses/Phys276/Hill/Information/Notes/ErrorAnalysis.html.

23 “Random and Systematic Errors,” Mathematics & Statistics | Texas Tech University, accessed July 06, 2020, https://www.math.ttu.edu/~gilliam/ttu/s08/m1300_s08/downloads/errors.pdf

24 A. Franklin et al., "Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?" The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 2 (1989): 229-31, www.jstor.org/stable/687514.

25 Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 63.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 127

28 Franklin et al., "Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?"

29 Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, 123.

30 Ibid., 124.

31 L. Petrinovich & P. O’Neill, “Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions,” Ethology & Sociobiology 17, no. 3 (1996): 145-71.

32 Jennifer L. Zamzow & Shaun Nichols, “Variations in Ethical Intuitions,” Philosophical Issues 19 (2009): 368-88.

33 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 241. 34 Matthew Allen DeStefano, "The Reliability and Nature of Philosophical Intuitions" (University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2014).

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 James Bogen, "Theory and Observation in Science," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed July 07, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/science-theory-observation/.

38 George Ellis & Joe Silk, "Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics," Nature 516 (2014): 321-23, doi:10.1038/516321a.

39 Ibid.

40 Matthew Chalmers, "The roots and fruits of string theory," CERN Courier, October 29, 2018, accessed July 11, 2020, https://cerncourier.com/a/the-roots-and-fruits-of-string-theory/.

41 Albert Rothenberg, "Creative Cognitive Processes in Kekulé's Discovery of the Structure of the Benzene Molecule," The American Journal of Psychology 108, no. 3 (1995): 419-38, doi:10.2307/1422898.

42 Lonsdale, K.. "The Structure of the Benzene Ring in Hexamethylbenzene". Proceedings of the Royal Society 123A (1929): 494-515. doi:10.1098/rspa.1929.0081.

43 Jonathan Phillips & Fiery Cushman, "Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible," PNAS 114, no. 18 (2017): 4649-54, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1619717114.

44 Joshua Green et al. “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science 293 (2001): 2105-8, doi:10.1126/science.1062872.

45 Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust, “The moral behavior of ethics professors: Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior,” Philosophical Psychology 27, no.3 (2014): 293-327, doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.727135

46 Ibid.

Bibliography

Books

Cappelen, Herman. Philosophy without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Grayling, A. C. The history of philosophy. New York: Penguin, 2019.

Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg, 2006. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm.

Ichikawa, Jonathan. "Who needs intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques." In Intuitions, edited by Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

Kuhn, Thomas S. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Pust, Joel. Intuitions as Evidence. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.

Sosa, Ernest. "Postscript to 'Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology.'" In Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996.

Taylor, John Robert. An Introduction to Error Analysis: The Study of Uncertainties in Physical Measurements. Sausalito, California: University Science Books, 1999.

Journal articles

Bahm, Archie J. "What Is Philosophy?" The Scientific Monthly 52, no. 6 (1941): 553-60. www.jstor.org/stable/17261.

Climenhaga, Nevin. "Intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy." Mind 127, no. 505 (2018): 69-104. https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/127/505/69/3800471.

DeStefano, Matthew Allen. "The Reliability and Nature of Philosophical Intuitions." University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2014.

Ellis, George & Joe Silk. "Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics." Nature 516 (2014). doi:10.1038/516321a.

Franklin, A. & M. Anderson & D. Brock & S. Coleman & J. Downing & A. Gruvander & J. Lilly et al. "Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?" The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 2 (1989): 229-31. www.jstor.org/stable/687514.

Green, Joshua & Sommerville, R. & Nystrom, Leigh & Darley, John & Cohen, Jonathan. “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment.” Science 293 (2001): 2105-8. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.

Gutting, Gary. "Can Philosophical Beliefs Be Rationally Justified?" American Philosophical Quarterly 19, no. 4 (1982): 315-30. www.jstor.org/stable/20013972.

Lonsdale, K.. "The Structure of the Benzene Ring in Hexamethylbenzene". Proceedings of the Royal Society 123A (1929): 494-515. doi:10.1098/rspa.1929.0081.

Purtill, Richard. "The Purpose of Science." Philosophy of Science 37, no. 2 (1970): 301-306. www.jstor.org/stable/186678.

Petrinovich, L. & P. O’Neill, “Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions.”

Ethology & Sociobiology 17, no. 3 (1996): 145-71.

Phillips, Jonathan & Fiery Cushman. "Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible." PNAS 114, no. 18 (2017): 4649-54. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1619717114.

Rothenberg, Albert. "Creative Cognitive Processes in Kekulé's Discovery of the Structure of the Benzene Molecule." The American Journal of Psychology 108, no. 3 (1995): 419-38. doi:10.2307/1422898.

Schwitzgebel, Eric & Joshua Rust. “The moral behavior of ethics professors: Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior.” Philosophical Psychology 27, no.3 (2014): 293-327.

doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.727135.

Searle, John. “Minds, Brains and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 417-57, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756.

Torretti, Roberto. "Observation." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37, no. 1 (1986): 1-23. www.jstor.org/stable/686995.

Zamzow, Jennifer L. & Shaun Nichols. “Variations in Ethical Intuitions.” Philosophical Issues

19 (2009): 368-88.

Websites

Bogen, James. "Theory and Observation in Science." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020), edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed July 07, 2020, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/science-theory-observation/.

Ellerton, Peter. “What exactly is the scientific method and why do so many people get it wrong?” School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry - University of Queensland. Last modified November 30, 2016. Accessed June 17, 2020.

https://hpi.uq.edu.au/article/2016/09/what-exactly-scientific-method-and-why-do-so-many-pe ople-get-it-wrong.

Hetherington, Stephen. "Gettier Problems." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed July 05, 2020, https://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier/.

“Random and Systematic Errors.” Mathematics & Statistics | Texas Tech University. Accessed July 06, 2020, https://www.math.ttu.edu/~gilliam/ttu/s08/m1300_s08/downloads/errors.pdf.

“Random vs Systematic Error.” UMD Department of Physics - UMD Physics. Accessed July 06, 2020. https://www.physics.umd.edu/courses/Phys276/Hill/Information/Notes/Error Analysis.html.

News articles

Chalmers, Matthew. "The roots and fruits of string theory." CERN Courier. October 29, 2018. Accessed July 11, 2020. https://cerncourier.com/a/the-roots-and-fruits-of-string-theory/.

Connor, Steve. “The core of truth behind Sir Isaac Newton’s apple.” The Independent. January 18, 2010. Accessed June 18, 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/ the-core-of-truth-behind-sir-isaac-newtons-apple-1870915.html.