2020年john locke約翰洛克哲學三等獎論文分享（雙語）

Urging the question is a reasonable enough suggestion: rather as empirical observation in science provides the basis for the evaluation of hypotheses concerning the workings of the physical universe, intuition would similarly seem to operate as a sounding board for the evaluation of arguments and theories (normative, of mind, knowledge, art, inter alia) in philosophy. But in order to better assess whether both entities occupy the same functional roles in their respective disciplines beyond this prima facie symmetry, it is necessary to submit either to a sort of truth-conditional analysis of its uses.

‘Observation’ in this discussion refers to the empirical data-gathering procedures – fieldwork, experiment, simulation, etc. – which, aided by the use of sophisticated technical instruments, form the basis of conventional scientific practice. A suitable definition of ‘intuition’, which in the literature has been variously interpreted as a belief, a disposition to believe, and even a wholly sui generis mental state, is more difficult.[1] However, as a working definition that best establishes a comparable functional role to ‘observation’ in science, an intuition may be described as a mental state approaching ‘surmise’, a kind of pre-theoretical impression about a state of affairs, often though not always with isolable propositional content, and of variable conviction and sophistication.

This discussion will focus on some of the more pressing and, in the author’s estimation, interesting threats to the intuition-observation symmetry, with particular emphasis on the incommensurability of data and the nature of falsification and academic consensus.

Resisting falsification in philosophy

One possible asymmetry between intuition and empirical observation is that the former is functionally impotent in respect of falsifying erroneous theories, unlike empirical data.

Essential to the scientific method is the notion that observation provides the fundamental basis for the evaluation of hypotheses. Specific, falsifiable hypotheses are subjected by a community of trained peers to several rounds of experimental scrutiny. The presence of any data directly contrary to the closely defined expectations of a hypothesis will begin to provide grounds for disconfirmation. Sufficient replication of disconfirmatory results will entirely annihilate its chances of widespread acceptance within a scientific community. As such, empirical observation may be imputed to bear the functional role of falsifying erroneous scientific theories.[2]

In philosophy, however, while one’s intuitions about a matter are sometimes treated as providing a sort of prima facie justification for believing a proposition, they might similarly contravene a particular argument’s conclusions, but with no necessary consequences for the argument’s veracity.

Consider William Macaskill’s simple hypothetical concerning whether an agent should save a multi-million-pound Picasso or a child from a burning building.[3] On a utilitarian framework, the likelier prescription, ceteris paribus, would probably be to save the painting, for the money acquired from its sale could be reliably used to purchase several anti-malaria bed nets for vulnerable African children, and unambiguously save many more lives.[4] Nevertheless, for various intuitive reasons, most agents would probably be more inclined to rescue the child.

However, despite the inconsistency between the utilitarian conclusion and quite plausibly an overwhelmingly popular contrary intuition, such an incompatibility alone does not necessarily disconfirm the utilitarian verdict, or the utility calculus at large, as with incongruous evidence in science. One can, in moves resembling Strawson’s distinction concerning ‘descriptive and revisionary metaphysics’, choose to defend one’s intuitions, or follow a chain of reasoning to its ultimate conclusions and revise them.[5]

Indeed, it would be no sin for the philosopher not to rule in accordance with strong intuitions, insofar as her conclusions were independently justified. If, as Peter Singer observes, one’s own interests really are no more important than others’, and it would be diminishing greater suffering to procure those anti- malaria bed nets, then perhaps the utilitarian verdict here is correct after all. As per Singer’s ‘escalator of reason’ metaphor, the autonomy of the human reasoning faculty ensures that, over our species’ evolutionary trajectory, the indiscriminate exercise of reason in worldly affairs is liable, eventually, to lead one towards certain difficult conclusions such as this.[6] It seems possible for one to be ‘rationally persuaded’ in this way of the truth of a nonetheless counterintuitive proposition.

But it is also possible that a certain falsificatory impotence is to be expected in ethics, where resisting intuitional pulls is often justified under the guise of systematising one’s judgements.

(Similar intuitional incongruity is also easily demonstrated in, for instance, the philosophy of mind: credence in physicalist and functionalist theories is threatened by strong intuitions about irreducible qualia, perhaps attributable to a species-wide “common-sense dualism”.[7] Yet such intuitional incongruity is again not understood to falsify these theories which, indeed, are popular philosophical positions.)[8] However, conceding a falsificatory impotence to intuition in even one major philosophical domain like ethics is sufficient to substantially disturb the intuition-observation symmetry.

Of course, if no other intuitions were involved here, this would also suggest that intuitional influences can be resisted altogether in evaluating philosophical theories. But this is not clear; indeed, it might be impossible to accept an argument’s conclusions without some intuitional motivation. Favouring the utilitarian or functionalist options above might appeal to certain, more fundamental intuitions concerning ethical consistency or logical laws, or even be reducible to broader intuitions resembling Kant’s transcendental categories, conditioning one’s experience. Indeed, if every philosophical judgement were intuitionally motivated, the possibility of intuitional falsification would itself be unfalsifiable – one’s intuitions might just happen to accord with the ‘correct’ position every time.

But in assessing intuitions, one would ultimately seem to be confronted with two possibilities:

• Either such fundamental, ‘categorical’ intuitions are independently verifiable – i.e., something like the law of non-contradiction may be construed as true independently of one’s experience of the world through it. On this view, siding with categorical intuitions in a philosophical dilemma may be regarded as being non-intuitionally, ‘rationally persuaded’ of a proposition. This means that, rather than a battle between competing intuitions, a real incongruity between a philosophical proposition and the remaining genuine intuition in the dilemma is preserved. Yet because this incongruity cannot alone falsify the theory, intuitions retain their falsificatory impotence.

• Or, if every philosophical judgement appeals to some intuition, including ineluctable perceptual categories, no intuition can be shown to be more ‘legitimate’ than another. One cannot demonstrate the validity of the law of non-contradiction because one cannot escape the categorical intuition of non-contradiction. Because of such sceptical concern, one is no more justified in siding with a category-based intuition than any other intuition. Hence, no intuition can be considered legitimate enough to establish from its relation to a theory an incongruity that may give rise to the theory’s falsification, and once again, intuitions retain their falsificatory impotence.

Thus, either because intuitional incongruity may be entirely repudiated or because it is impossible to establish genuine intuitional incongruity, philosophical propositions would not seem to be intuitionally falsifiable. Naturally, moreover, if one cannot distinguish the intuitional circumstances under which a philosophical theory would be false, then one cannot establish conditions for intuitional verification or Popperian ‘corroboration’ of philosophical theories, either.[9]

Resisting falsification in science

But there is another variable that would threaten intuition’s apparently exclusive falsificatory impotence. As Thomas Kuhn observed, in science, observational data can be ‘theory-laden’.[10] In particular, there is a permanent possibility that an observer brings to bear various theoretical presuppositions that filter their perception and conceptualisation of empirical data.

Because these background assumptions are never themselves subject to experimental scrutiny, two scientists belonging to radically different paradigms can interpret the same phenomena as vindicatory of different hypotheses. Thus, “when Aristotle and Galileo looked at swinging stones, the first saw constrained fall, the second a pendulum”.[11] These experiments may be reproduced indefinitely, and yet, because they are unable to distinguish between the conceptual underpinnings of either hypothesis, the empirical data appear consistent with both and unable to falsify either.[12] It would hence seem that, just as intuitions cannot falsify erroneous philosophical theories, the theory-ladenness of observational data constrains their ability to falsify erroneous scientific hypotheses, too.

However, differences in the theoretical presuppositions of competing hypotheses have not always been significant enough to adversely affect predictive power, indicating that their sensitivity to the truth is not significantly compromised by interstitial conceptual details. Famously, Priestley and Lavoisier obtained the same quantitative results in key experiments on combustion, although one was an adherent of the theory of phlogiston, and the other of oxygen.[13]

Additionally, an observer’s theoretical presuppositions can be greatly rectified by subsequent generations when previously overlooked implications of their hypotheses come to conflict with established data. As Popper remarks, competing hypotheses undergo a process resembling natural selection, whereby one is provisionally adopted if it constitutes an improvement over an existing paradigm in respect of explanatory power, and holds promise in respect of predictive power.[14] Crucially, its integration into a field’s multi-paradigm matrix requires the attempted falsification of its most radical predictions, deduced as ‘propositions’ from the initial hypothesis.[15] This hypervigilant screening of hypotheses serves to sustain a longer-term falsificatory potency in science. One might then still reasonably conclude that intuition in philosophy is possessed of a falsificatory impotence not rivalled even by theory-laden observation in science.

One minor concession that might be made in intuition’s favour is that intuitional judgements still exert some influence over an argument’s palatability. The counterintuitive quality of the utilitarian verdict in Macaskill’s dilemma, though not binding one to any conclusion about the argument, might place an added epistemological burden on one who ignores the pull of her intuitions to justify this opposite judgement. This may also explain why philosophers from Grice to Parfit are often compelled to provide ‘error theories’ that ‘explain away’ intuitional incongruity.[16] However, this is still far from occupying the role of outright falsification that empirical observation plays in science.

Intuitional variation

Another curious aspect of the intuitional character is that it is subject to two kinds of variation not available to its putative empirical counterpart. First, and less consequentially, there is some variation in the importance that is often granted to philosophical intuitions. With respect to fringe ethical scenarioses, philosophers – including the aforementioned Singer and Macaskill – sometimes recommend that one should not always rely so closely on one’s intuitions, without the risk of an almighty backlash from their peers, such as one might expect were one to encounter a scientist exhorting others not to consider empirical data.

Secondly, it is an open question whether intuitions have any objective basis, but even supposing they do, philosophy appears to lack a common evaluative framework with which members of the profession might independently reach the same, ‘legitimate’ intuitive judgements. No amount of philosophical analysis seems fit to isolate ‘correct’ intuitions, much less without eroding the common-sense understanding of intuitions as pre-theoretical impressions.

One consequence of the lack of such a framework is that intuitions are in practice subject to a degree of irresolvable individual variation. Thus, two new asymmetries in the functional roles of intuition and observation emerge: first, critical internal disagreement between ‘philosophical data’ is made possible, whereas in science, empirical data are in principle and increasingly in practice assimilable under common theoretical frameworks (although present difficulties in, e.g. reconciling the Standard Model with general relativity may disturb this trend). But inconsistent datasets of this sort also prevent ‘results’ from being reproducible, creating a diffidence towards scholarly consensus in philosophy. By contrast, although Kuhnian paradigm shifts can disturb the solidity of scientific consensus, the truth-sensitivity of scientific practice, evident in the ‘epistemic pruning’ of empirical falsification, contributes to a kind of long-term consensus hitherto unseen in philosophy.[17]

Conclusion

It is difficult to glean the precise influence of intuition over all philosophical inquiry. The philosopher finds herself in the unusual position of being swayed by intuitional data, even conjuring error theories to account for them, in a discipline in which confirmatory intuitional data are not even an explicit sine qua non of theoretical legitimacy.

However, intuitional judgements would at least seem to vary significantly enough in nature and application as to occupy a different functional role from observation. This is epitomised in the relevant dissimilarities of being incommensurable, indisposed to scholarly consensus, and unable to falsify erroneous theories.

Author's Note:

Because it is not possible to demonstrate exhaustively over the course of an essay of this sort whether falsification through intuitional judgement is really impossible in all areas of philosophy, the author has elected instead (with relevant qualifications to his argument) to survey moral philosophy and, briefly, philosophy of mind, to provide an indication of the scope of such a criticism.

​中文版

提出這個(ge) 問題是一個(ge) 足夠合理的建議：正如科學中的經驗觀察為(wei) 評估有關(guan) 物理宇宙運作的假設提供了基礎，直覺似乎同樣可以作為(wei) 評估論據和理論的共鳴板（規範性，思想，知識，藝術等）在哲學中。但是，為(wei) 了更好地評估這兩(liang) 個(ge) 實體(ti) 是否在其各自學科中占據相同的功能角色，超出這種表麵上的對稱性，有必要對其使用進行一種真值條件分析。

本討論中的“觀察”是指經驗性數據收集程序——田野調查、實驗、模擬等——在使用複雜技術儀(yi) 器的幫助下，形成了傳(chuan) 統科學實踐的基礎。“直覺”在文獻中被不同地解釋為(wei) 一種信念、一種相信的傾(qing) 向，甚至是一種完全自成一體(ti) 的心理狀態，要給它下一個(ge) 合適的定義(yi) 就比較困難了。[1]然而，作為(wei) 最能建立與(yu) 科學中“觀察”類似的功能角色的工作定義(yi) ，直覺可以被描述為(wei) 接近“推測”的心理狀態，一種對事態狀態的前理論印象，往往雖然不總是具有可分離的命題內(nei) 容，並且具有可變的信念和複雜性。

本次討論將集中在對直覺-觀察對稱性的一些更緊迫且據作者估計有趣的威脅上，特別強調數據的不可通約性以及偽(wei) 造和學術共識的性質。

抵製哲學造假

直覺和經驗觀察之間可能存在的一種不對稱性是，與(yu) 經驗數據不同，直覺在偽(wei) 造錯誤理論方麵在功能上是無能為(wei) 力的。

科學方法的本質是這樣一種觀念，即觀察為(wei) 假設的評估提供了基本基礎。具體(ti) 的、可證偽(wei) 的假設由一群受過訓練的同行進行多輪實驗審查。任何直接與(yu) 嚴(yan) 格定義(yi) 的假設期望相反的數據的存在都將開始為(wei) 不證實提供依據。不確鑿的結果的充分複製將完全消除其在科學界被廣泛接受的機會(hui) 。因此，經驗觀察可能被認為(wei) 具有偽(wei) 造錯誤科學理論的功能性作用。[2]

然而，在哲學中，雖然人們(men) 對事物的直覺有時被視為(wei) 為(wei) 相信一個(ge) 命題提供了一種表麵上的正當理由，但它們(men) 可能同樣與(yu) 特定論證的結論相抵觸，但對論證的真實性沒有必然的後果。

考慮一下 William Macaskill 關(guan) 於(yu) 代理人是否應該從(cong) 燃燒的建築物中救出價(jia) 值數百萬(wan) 英鎊的畢加索或兒(er) 童的簡單假設。[3]在功利主義(yi) 的框架下，在其他條件不變的情況下，更可能的處方可能是保存這幅畫，因為(wei) 從(cong) 其出售中獲得的錢可以可靠地用於(yu) 為(wei) 脆弱的非洲兒(er) 童購買(mai) 幾張抗瘧疾蚊帳，並且毫不含糊地保存更多的生命。[4]然而，出於(yu) 各種直覺原因，大多數代理人可能更傾(qing) 向於(yu) 營救孩子。

然而，盡管功利主義(yi) 的結論與(yu) 相當合理的壓倒性流行的相反直覺之間存在不一致，但僅(jin) 這種不相容性並不一定會(hui) 否定功利主義(yi) 的判決(jue) 或整個(ge) 效用演算，就像科學中不協調的證據一樣。在類似於(yu) 斯特勞森關(guan) 於(yu) “描述性和修正性形而上學”的區分中，人們(men) 可以選擇捍衛自己的直覺，或者遵循一係列推理得出最終結論並對其進行修改。[5]

事實上，哲學家不按照強烈的直覺進行統治並沒有什麽(me) 罪，隻要她的結論是獨立的。如果像彼得·辛格（Peter Singer）所觀察到的那樣，自己的利益真的不比他人的利益重要，並且購買(mai) 那些抗瘧疾蚊帳會(hui) 減少更大的痛苦，那麽(me) 這裏的功利主義(yi) 判決(jue) 也許畢竟是正確的。根據辛格的“理性自動扶梯”隱喻，人類推理能力的自主性確保了，在我們(men) 物種的進化軌跡中，在世俗事務中不加選擇地運用理性最終可能導致人們(men) 得出某些困難的結論，例如： . [6]似乎有可能以這種方式“合理地說服”一個(ge) 盡管如此違反直覺的命題的真實性。

但也有可能在倫(lun) 理學中可以預料到某種偽(wei) 造的無能，在倫(lun) 理學中，抵製直覺的拉動通常是在係統化自己的判斷的幌子下被證明的。

（類似的直覺不一致也很容易在心智哲學中得到證明：物理主義(yi) 和功能主義(yi) 理論的可信度受到關(guan) 於(yu) 不可約質的強烈直覺的威脅，這可能歸因於(yu) 物種範圍的“常識二元論”。[7]然而，這種直覺上的不協調再次不能被理解為(wei) 證偽(wei) 這些理論，這些理論確實是流行的哲學立場。）[8]然而，即使在倫(lun) 理學這樣一個(ge) 主要的哲學領域，承認直覺的證偽(wei) 無能也足以嚴(yan) 重擾亂(luan) 直覺-觀察對稱。

當然，如果這裏不涉及其他直覺，這也表明在評估哲學理論時可以完全抵製直覺的影響。但這並不清楚；事實上，如果沒有一些直覺動機，可能無法接受論證的結論。偏愛上麵的功利主義(yi) 或功能主義(yi) 選項可能會(hui) 訴諸關(guan) 於(yu) 倫(lun) 理一致性或邏輯規律的某些更基本的直覺，甚至可以簡化為(wei) 類似於(yu) 康德的先驗範疇的更廣泛的直覺，調節一個(ge) 人的經驗。事實上，如果每一個(ge) 哲學判斷都是由直覺驅動的，那麽(me) 直覺證偽(wei) 的可能性本身就是不可證偽(wei) 的——一個(ge) 人的直覺可能恰好每次都符合“正確”的立場。

但在評估直覺時，人們(men) 最終似乎會(hui) 麵臨(lin) 兩(liang) 種可能性：

• 這種基本的、“分類的”直覺要麽(me) 是獨立可驗證的——也就是說，像不矛盾定律這樣的東(dong) 西可以獨立於(yu) 一個(ge) 人通過它對世界的經驗來解釋為(wei) 真實的。根據這種觀點，在哲學困境中站在分類直覺一邊可能被認為(wei) 是非直覺地“合理地說服”了一個(ge) 命題。這意味著，哲學命題與(yu) 困境中剩餘(yu) 的真實直覺之間的真正不協調不是相互競爭(zheng) 的直覺之間的戰鬥，而是被保留下來。然而，由於(yu) 這種不協調不能單獨證偽(wei) 理論，直覺保留了它們(men) 證偽(wei) 的無能。

• 或者，如果每一個(ge) 哲學判斷都訴諸某種直覺，包括不可避免的感知範疇，那麽(me) 沒有一種直覺比另一種更“合理”。人們(men) 無法證明不矛盾律的有效性，因為(wei) 我們(men) 無法擺脫不矛盾的絕對直覺。由於(yu) 這種懷疑的擔憂，一個(ge) 基於(yu) 類別的直覺比任何其他直覺都沒有道理。因此，任何直覺都不能被認為(wei) 是合法的，可以從(cong) 它與(yu) 理論的關(guan) 係中建立起可能導致理論被證偽(wei) 的不協調，並且直覺再次保持其證偽(wei) 的無能。

因此，要麽(me) 因為(wei) 直覺不協調可能被完全否定，要麽(me) 因為(wei) 不可能建立真正的直覺不協調，哲學命題似乎在直覺上是不可證偽(wei) 的。此外，自然地，如果我們(men) 不能區分哲學理論在哪些直覺環境下是錯誤的，那麽(me) 我們(men) 也無法為(wei) 哲學理論的直覺驗證或波普爾式的“佐證”建立條件。[9]

抵製科學造假

但是還有另一個(ge) 變量會(hui) 威脅到直覺明顯排他的可證偽(wei) 的無能。正如托馬斯·庫恩（Thomas Kuhn）所觀察到的，在科學中，觀測數據可能是“充滿理論的”。[10]特別是，觀察者有一種永久的可能性，即通過各種理論預設來過濾他們(men) 對經驗數據的感知和概念化。

因為(wei) 這些背景假設本身永遠不會(hui) 受到實驗審查，所以屬於(yu) 完全不同範式的兩(liang) 位科學家可以將相同的現象解釋為(wei) 對不同假設的辯護。因此，“當亞(ya) 裏士多德和伽利略看著擺動的石頭時，第一個(ge) 看到的是受約束的墜落，第二個(ge) 看到的是鍾擺”。[11]這些實驗可以無限期地重複，然而，因為(wei) 它們(men) 無法區分任一假設的概念基礎，經驗數據似乎與(yu) 兩(liang) 者一致，也無法證偽(wei) 。[12]因此，正如直覺不能證偽(wei) 錯誤的哲學理論一樣，觀測數據的理論負載也限製了他們(men) 證偽(wei) 錯誤科學假設的能力。

然而，相互競爭(zheng) 的假設的理論預設的差異並不總是足夠顯著地對預測能力產(chan) 生不利影響，這表明它們(men) 對真相的敏感性並未受到間隙概念細節的顯著影響。眾(zhong) 所周知，Priestley 和 Lavoisier 在燃燒的關(guan) 鍵實驗中獲得了相同的定量結果，盡管其中一個(ge) 是燃素理論的擁護者，另一個(ge) 是氧氣理論的擁護者。[13]

此外，當先前被忽視的假設的含義(yi) 與(yu) 已建立的數據發生衝(chong) 突時，後續幾代人可以極大地糾正觀察者的理論預設。正如波普爾所說，相互競爭(zheng) 的假設經曆了一個(ge) 類似於(yu) 自然選擇的過程，如果一個(ge) 假設在解釋力方麵構成了對現有範式的改進，並且在預測力方麵有希望，那麽(me) 它就會(hui) 被臨(lin) 時采用。[14]至關(guan) 重要的是，將其整合到一個(ge) 領域的多範式矩陣中需要嚐試偽(wei) 造其最激進的預測，從(cong) 初始假設中推斷為(wei) “命題”。[15]這種對假設的高度警惕的篩選有助於(yu) 維持科學中長期的偽(wei) 造效力。然後人們(men) 仍然可以合理地得出結論，哲學中的直覺具有一種可證偽(wei) 的無能，即使是科學中充滿理論的觀察也無法與(yu) 之匹敵。

一個(ge) 有利於(yu) 直覺的小讓步是直覺判斷仍然對論證的適口性產(chan) 生一些影響。Macaskill 困境中的功利主義(yi) 判決(jue) 的反直覺性質，雖然沒有約束一個(ge) 關(guan) 於(yu) 該論點的任何結論，但可能會(hui) 給一個(ge) 忽視她的直覺拉動以證明這種相反判斷的人增加額外的認識論負擔。這也可以解釋為(wei) 什麽(me) 從(cong) Grice 到 Parfit 的哲學家經常被迫提供“解釋”直覺不協調的“錯誤理論”。[16]然而，這還遠遠沒有占據經驗觀察在科學中所扮演的徹底證偽(wei) 的角色。

直覺變化

直覺特征的另一個(ge) 奇怪的方麵是它受製於(yu) 假定的經驗對應物所不具備的兩(liang) 種變化。首先，並且不太重要的是，通常賦予哲學直覺的重要性存在一些差異。關(guan) 於(yu) 邊緣的倫(lun) 理場景，哲學家——包括前麵提到的辛格和馬卡斯基爾——有時建議人們(men) 不應該總是如此密切地依賴自己的直覺，以免受到同行的強烈反對，就像人們(men) 可能會(hui) 遇到的那樣一位科學家勸告他人不要考慮經驗數據。

其次，直覺是否有任何客觀基礎是一個(ge) 懸而未決(jue) 的問題，但即使有，哲學似乎也缺乏一個(ge) 共同的評估框架，專(zhuan) 業(ye) 人士可以利用該框架獨立地得出相同的、“合法的”直覺判斷。再多的哲學分析似乎都不適合孤立“正確”的直覺，更不用說不侵蝕對直覺作為(wei) 前理論印象的常識性理解。

缺乏這樣一個(ge) 框架的一個(ge) 後果是直覺在實踐中受到一定程度的無法解決(jue) 的個(ge) 體(ti) 差異的影響。因此，直覺和觀察的功能角色出現了兩(liang) 個(ge) 新的不對稱：首先，“哲學數據”之間的關(guan) 鍵內(nei) 部分歧成為(wei) 可能，而在科學中，經驗數據在原則上並且在實踐中越來越多地在共同的理論框架下被吸收（盡管存在困難，例如協調標準模型與(yu) 廣義(yi) 相對論可能會(hui) 擾亂(luan) 這一趨勢）。但是這種不一致的數據集也阻止了“結果”的可重複性，從(cong) 而對哲學的學術共識產(chan) 生了分歧。相比之下，盡管庫恩的範式轉變會(hui) 擾亂(luan) 科學共識的穩固性，科學實踐的真理敏感性，[17]

結論

很難收集直覺對所有哲學探究的確切影響。哲學家發現自己處於(yu) 受直覺數據影響的不同尋常的位置，甚至變出錯誤理論來解釋它們(men) ，在一個(ge) 學科中，證實性的直覺數據甚至不是理論合法性的明確必要條件。

然而，直覺判斷至少在性質和應用上似乎有很大的不同，以至於(yu) 占據了與(yu) 觀察不同的功能角色。這體(ti) 現在不可通約性、不適應學術共識和無法證偽(wei) 錯誤理論的相關(guan) 差異上。

Footnotes:

1 Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/)

2 More contentious is the claim that empirical data serves to ‘verify’ hypotheses it is consistent with, as Popper noted. Because of the inductive nature of scientific practice, one can at most assert that theory-data consistency may serve to ‘corroborate’ a theory, resulting in its provisional adoption and possible retention after repeated attempts at falsification – and even then, only as a ‘working model’ of the phenomenon in question, and not holy writ.

3 William Macaskill, Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (Guardian Faber, 2016)

4 Let it be assumed that the funds obtained from the auctioning of the painting could be counted upon to save more lives, with no extraneous factors tipping the utility calculus in the other direction (one might, for instance, donate to a GiveWell-approved charity such as the Against Malaria Foundation).

5 Peter Frederick Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Routledge, 1964)

6 Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 135-137

7 Paul Bloom, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (Penguin, 2011), pp.191-192

8 Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J., ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 170, pp. 465–500 (2014) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7

9 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002, 2nd ed.), pp. 248-252

10 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012, 4th ed.), pp. 111-113

11 Ibid. pp. 121-122

12 Ibid. pp. 112-115

13 Conant, J.B., (ed.) “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775–1789,” in J.B. Conant and L.K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Studies in Experimental Science, vol. I, (Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 74–80

14 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 90-92

15 Ibid.

16 Climenhaga, Nevin, ‘Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind, Vol. 127, Issue 505, January 2018, pp. 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032

17 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 50-52

Bibliography

Bloom, P., Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human (Penguin, 2011)

Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J., ‘What do philosophers believe?’, Philosophical Studies Vol. 170, pp. 465–500 (2014) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7

Climenhaga, Nevin, ‘Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind, Vol. 127, Issue 505, January 2018, pp. 69–104, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032

Conant, J.B., (ed.) “The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775– 1789,” in J.B. Conant and L.K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Studies in Experimental Science, vol. 1 (Harvard University Press, 1957)

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 2012)

Macaskill, W., Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (Guardian Faber, 2016)

Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 2002)

Pust, Joel, "Intuition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Ed.), Edward N.Zalta (ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/intuition/)

Singer, P., The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton University Press, 2011)

Strawson, P.F., Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Routledge, 1964)